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"The [P]resident's plan largely relies on reduction in interest rates as opposed to
reduction in principal and that makes a lot ofsense. We should let the [P]resident's
plan, other than the bankruptcy part, go forward and see how it works."'
"When we allowed mortgage securitization, we created this hole, and we are
obliged to fill it. Only a judge can cut through the nightmare of bureaucracy that a
homeowner faces trying to sort through this mess. Securitized mortgages caused it,
and there is only one practical way to clear it up ... .n2
I. INTRODUCTION
Our country currently finds itself embroiled in the most serious
economic crisis since the Great Depression. Experts agree that the
current economic situation arose out of various indiscretions in the
housing market - particularly, the aggressive behavior of both lenders and
investors in the subprime lending industry.3 As a result, millions of
J.D., Drake University Law School, 2010; BA, Grinnell College, 2006. I would like to thank
Professor Cathy Lesser Mansfield of Drake University Law School for her comments and encouragement as I
developed this topic and for inspiring me to view the wide landscape of commercial law through the eyes of
the consumer.
1 Marcia Coyle, Bankruptcyjudges May Be Enlisted to Combat Soaring Home Foredosures, 241 N.Y.L.J. 5,
5 (2009) (quoting Pepperdine's Mark S. Scarberry).
2 155 CONG. REC. S4915 (daily ed. Apr. 30,2009) (statement ofSen. Whitehouse).
See, e.g., R tory Resructunng Enhancing msumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing Before the H
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Americans have lost their homes to foreclosure - a trend that is certain to
continue if the government does not act swiftly and decisively to stop it.4
Last year, a bill was introduced in the newly elected Congress that
proposed a simple, common-sense solution to the rising tide of
foreclosures.s This bill - the Helping Families Save Their Homes in
Bankruptcy Act of 2009 ("Cramdown Bill") - would have allowed
Chapter 13 bankruptcy judges to modify the terms of mortgage loans
secured by a bankrupt's principal residence.6
While the concept of mortgage modification - also known as
"cramdown" - is not a new tool for bankruptcy judges, the proposal to
apply cramdown to principal residences was met with a great deal of
resistance from within Congress and by other interested parties.
According to Alabama Sen. Jeff Sessions, "[wjhen people borrow money
to buy a house, . . . they must realize 'the money didn't come from
nowhere.' The money was lent to them, and lenders have to know they
are going to be repaid. . . . 'There's no free lunch here[.]'" 8  However,
Comm. on Fin. Sews., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (written testimony of Kathleen E. Keest, Senior Policy Counsel,
Center for Responsible Lending) ("[S]ubprime lenders pushed homeowners into more expensive, more
volatile loans because of the higher fees they generated and because there would likely be another new loan in
fairly short order."); Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic Crisis: Heating Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Afairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2008) (written testimony of Eric Stein,
Senior Vice-President, Center for Responsible Lending) ("To increase loan volume, lenders adopted even
riskier practices and products .... The fact that Wall Street paid the most for the most dangerous mortgages
meant that originators provided these loans, often regardless of their ultimate sustainability.").
See Nina Liao, Note, Cramming Down the Housing Crisis: Amending 11 U.S.C. 1322(b) to Protect
Homeowners and Create a Sustainable Bankruptcy System, 93 MINN. L REV. 2240, 2241 (2009) ("In the first
quarter of 2008 alone, foreclosure filings increased by more than 100 percent from the same period a year
prior, and foreclosures for the entire year will run at about 2.25 million. Moreover, economists project that
ten million more homeowners will foreclose over the next five years.").
s See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, H.R 200, 111th Cong.
(referred to the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on Feb. 24, 2009). An identical version of the House bill was
introduced in the Senate on January 6,2009. See Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of
2009, S. 61, 111th Cong.
6 H.R 200, S 4; S. 61, S 4.
See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 1, at 5 ("[T~he lending industry's arguments [are] that the legislation will
result in higher mortgage interest rates, increased down payments and higher closing costs and encourage
people to go into bankruptcy."); American Bankruptcy Institute, Legislatine Highghts, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Sept. 2009, at 95 [hereinafter ABI] (noting that the Cramdown Bill, sponsored by Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin,
"is bitterly opposed by the mortgage-lending industry"); Bankruptcy Rform: Senate Judiciary Panel Revisits
Cramdown Option to Stem Tide of U.S. Foreosures, BANIR. L. DAILY, July 24, 2009 [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Reform] ("Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), the ranking member of the committee, expressed skepticism that
allowing bankruptcy judges to cram down mortgage loans on primary residences would resolve the
foreclosure crisis.").
8 Bankruptcy Refo-n, supra note 7.
THE CASE FOR "CRAMDOWN"
Chapter 13 bankruptcy judges are allowed to use cramdown as a "free
lunch" for, essentially, all other claims for secured debt.9 Given this
inconsistency in bankruptcy law, why are some members of Congress and
the lending industry so adamantly opposed to using cramdown on a
bankrupt's primary residence?
The answer to this question is rooted not only in the practical
limitations on cramdown, but in the ideologies held by some in
government, as well as the palpable self-interest of the mortgage lending
industry. While it is true that "[t]he debtor's gain from cram-down equals
the creditor's loss,"1o the losses ought to fall on those who took the risk -
lenders and investors - rather than the homeowners whose lives will be
forever altered by a home foreclosure. To date, the government has
invested billions of dollars for the purpose of stabilizing the housing
market." Accordingly, the time has now come for a solution that, if
implemented, would eliminate the continued use of tax dollars to mitigate
the losses of mortgage lenders and mortgage-backed security investors.
Unfortunately, President Obama's plan - the Home Affordable
Modification Program ("HAMP") 12  - does not go far enough.
Consumers have had difficulty obtaining voluntary mortgage
modifications under HAMP, and those lucky enough to receive a
voluntary mortgage modification from their lender often end up with a
loan that fails to meet HAMP guidelines. 3  Additionally, many servicers
of securitized mortgages are unwilling to enter into voluntary loan
9 See 11 U.S.C. S 1322(b)(2) (2007) (stating that the debtor's Chapter 13 repayment "plan may...
modify the rights of holders of secured claims . . ."); Liao, supra note 4, at 2249 ("[T]he Code allows
bankruptcy judges to cram down various types of secured debt, except for mortgages solely secured by the
debtor's primary residence.").
'o Liao, supra note 4, at 2249.
See generally Edmund L Andrews & David E. Sanger, U.S. Is Finding Its Role in Business Hard to
Umind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at Al, available at httpVAvww.nytimes.conV
2009/09/14/businessl4big.html? ("The scale of the Fed's intervention has been staggering.... [T]he
govemment is propping up almost the entire mortgage market and, by extension, the housing industry.").
12 For more information on HAMP, see Home Affordable Modifications,
http/makinghomeaffordable.gov/modificationeligibility.html (last visitedJune 9,2010).
13 See The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time to Reconsider Bankrupty Refom Hearing Before the
Subcommn. o Administrative Ovrsight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 111th Cong. 23-27 (2009)
[hereinafter Worsening Foreclosure Hearings] (written testimony of Alys Cohen, National Consumer Law
Center). According to Cohen, some participating servicers are: (1) requiring borrowers to execute waivers of
their legal rights in exchange for modifications; (2) offering modification plans that do not conform to HAMP
guidelines, despite the servicer's assurances to the contrary (3) simply refusing to perform HAMP
modifications entirely despite an eligible borrower's right to a HAMP review, and (4) charging fees for loan
modifications under the program - all ofwhich is prohibited by HAMP. Id.; Bankruptcy Refon, supra note 7.
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modifications.14 Meanwhile, more and more homeowners are headed for
foreclosure without an effective remedy to protect them from their
lenders, who possess the financial capability to pursue a foreclosure that
far outweighs a homeowner's ability to resist.15
This paper will argue that the most effective remedy for the
foreclosure crisis is to amend section 1322(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to
allow for modification of mortgage loans, with no exceptions.
Hereinafter, I will refer to this remedy for the foreclosure crisis as "pure
mortgage modification." In Part II, this paper will summarize various
other proposals offered to reduce foreclosures, some of which argue that
pure mortgage modification is impractical and costly. In Part III, this
paper will identify the ideological bases for the opposition to pure
mortgage modification; mainly, that pure mortgage modification treats
lenders unfairly. After addressing these ideological concerns, this paper
will ultimately conclude that pure mortgage modification should be an
option open, not only to homeowners involved in Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceedings, but should be available by way of state or federal law to all
homeowners against whom a mortgage lender or servicer is pursuing
foreclosure. Mortgage lenders, servicers, and Wall Street mortgage-
backed securities investors have had their proverbial "carrot." 16 It is time
for Congress to prod them with the "stick."47
14 See Worsening Foredosure Hearings, supra note 13, at 22 ("[T]he [HAMP] program has significant
limitations both in design and implementation. HAMP's ability to guarantee an increase in sustainable
modifications is dependent on voluntary servicer participation in the program. Several large servicers are still
not participating .. . ."); Bankruptcy Reformn, supra note 7.
15 See, eg, Binyamin Appelbaum, Resaied Banks Post Big Profits, Drawing Ire, WASH. POST, July 18,
2009, available at http/www.washingtonpost.corm/wp-dyr/content/article/2009/(T7/17/ AR2009071700885.html
(noting the combined $13.6 billion in second-quarter earnings for Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman
Sachs, and J.P. Morgan Chase); Robin SidelJ.P. Morgan Sees Earnings Soar, WAIL ST.J., Oct 15, 2009, available
at httpV/online.wsj.com/article/SB125551544966884573.html (detailing the "sevenfold" increase in third-
quarter earnings ofJ.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and citing its ability to "pour[ ] another $2 billion into reserves
for soured loans in its consumer businesses.").
16 See 155 CONG. REc. S4915, S4920 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Schumer) ("We
have been pushing banks to do loan modifications for more than 2 years now and, frankly, we don't have
much to show for it ... We have offered lenders and servicers plenty of carrots, but it is unfortunately clear
we also need a stick. The reason the programs in the past have largely not worked is it was just carrots and no
stick. We need both.").
17 Id.
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I. PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO PURE MORTGAGE
MODIFICATION
A. The Columbia Authors' Approach
One alternative proposal to pure mortgage modification is grounded
in the complex incentive structures of the market for mortgage-backed
securities. In 2008, "[s]ecuritized subprime, alt-A, and prime/jumbo
loans accounted for more than one-half of foreclosure starts. ... " While
this fact may fail to surprise given the aforementioned increase in
foreclosures,19 what is truly startling is that these same securitized loans
also represented a mere fifteen percent of all mortgages outstanding in
2008.20 Based on the assumptions that mortgage servicers are "not
compensated appropriately to handle the current volume of
delinquencies[,]" subject to "explicit and implicit legal barriers to
modifying mortgages successfully[,]" and that the existence of second
liens on many homes discourages modification of first-lien mortgages,
Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison, and Tomasz Piskorski, hereinafter
referred to as the Columbia authors, propose a three-pronged approach to
solving the foreclosure crisis.2 ' Generally, the Columbia authors argue
that the following proposals will lead to a resolution of the foreclosure
crisis in the United States: (1) creating additional incentive fees for
servicers to perform mortgage modifications; (2) establishing incentive
payments for second lenders who voluntarily forfeit their liens; and (3)
creating a "litigation safe harbor" to "insulate[ ] servicers from costly
litigation" on the part of angry investors whose returns have diminished.2 2
This plan will, according to the Columbia authors, cost the government a
mere $12.35 billion, and will purportedly "avoid between 675,000 and one
million foreclosures" of the aforementioned privately securitized
mortgages, in addition to "facilitat[ing] hundreds of thousands of
modifications among mortgages controlled by [government sponsored
entities ("GSEs")] or portfolio lenders."2
While the Columbia authors do not completely repudiate pure
mortgage modification as a means of stopping foreclosures, they argue
18 Christopher Mayer et al.,A New Proposalfor Loan Modgication, 26YALEJ. ON REG. 417, 417 (2009).
19 See supra note 4 and accompanying text
0 Mayer et al., supra note 18, at 417-18.
21 Id. at 418-19.
22 See id. at 420-23.
2 Id. at 424, 429.
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that it is far less advantageous than its proponents make it sound.2 4 First,
the Columbia authors argue that pure mortgage modification would apply
to too many mortgages, setting up a system that would "pit federal judges
against the GSEs" - entities that guarantee nearly seventy percent of all
outstanding mortgages and "can already ensure fair modifications." 2 5
Next, the Columbia authors argue that "cramdown would likely impose
excessive losses on lenders," and that applying cramdown uniformly to all
residential mortgages in bankruptcy would ignore the need for balancing
foreclosure prevention with minimizing lenders' losses.2 6 If cramdown
were applied so liberally, they argue, borrowers would have very little
incentive to accept a mortgage modification offer from a lender, and
would thus "eliminate[ ] the possibility that a lender can ever recover its
losses on borrowing." 27 Finally, the Columbia authors assert that such a
permissive cramdown policy would flood the courts with bankruptcy
filings, a circumstance that would "delay a resolution of the crisis" and
lead to a rise in the future cost of credit for other borrowers.2 8
While certainly not frivolous, none of the arguments advanced by the
Columbia authors against pure mortgage modification conclusively prove
that it is a fool's errand. Taking the Columbia authors' arguments in
reverse order, the assertion that pure mortgage modification would lead to
an untenable rise in the number of bankruptcy filings is tempered
somewhat by the fact that lenders in many states where nonjudicial
foreclosure is unavailable as a remedy must proceed via judicial
foreclosure. 29  Given the staggering increase in foreclosures, it follows
logically that a similar "flood" of foreclosure filings must already be
happening in state courts of general jurisdiction. If every single
homeowner in those foreclosure actions had the option to enter
bankruptcy and obtain a pure mortgage modification, the amount of
litigation would not necessarily increase. Rather, the major effect on
foreclosure litigation would be a change in the identity of the petitioner,
24 See id. at 426 ("Proponents of [cramdown] believe it would impose no ... costs on taxpayers. That
is untrue. Cramdown may be no more costly than doing nothing about the foreclosure crisis, but doing
nothing is not the only alternative. Relative to our proposal, cramdown exposes taxpayers to significant
losses.").
2 Id.
26 Mayer et al., supra note 18, at 426.
Z Id.
2 Id. at 427.
9 See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 440 (6th
ed. 2009) ("All states allowjudicial foreclosure.... A majority of states also permit power of sale (nonjudicial)
foreclosure.") (emphasis omitted).
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the availability of the federal forum as an alternative to state courts, and
the remedies available to both parties; none of which indicate, on their
face, a precipitous increase in the amount of foreclosure cases that will
end up in bankruptcy court.
As for discouraging borrowers' acceptance of voluntary mortgage
modifications offered by lenders outside of bankruptcy, there is already a
major reason for homeowners to refrain from accepting a mortgage
modification offered by a lender, and instead proceed to bankruptcy court.
Under current law, the Internal Revenue Code treats acceptance of
mortgage modifications that reduce the amount of the borrower's
principal balance as income to the borrower, unless the borrower is
insolvent or is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.30  While the tax
consequences of pure mortgage modification are beyond the scope of this
paper, it is important to note that most lenders do not offer principal
reductions as part of their mortgage modification plans. 3  Therefore, the
specter of increased income tax liability is less of a risk to borrowers
whose lenders are not actually cancelling any of their outstanding
indebtedness. However, a principal reduction is exactly what some
borrowers need to make their home loans affordable again.32 Allowing a
bankruptcy judge to reduce the principal amount owed in bankruptcy
would, at the very least, encourage mortgage lenders to voluntarily offer
principal reductions to their borrowers, which would, in turn, require a
separate debate on federal tax policy. However, this debate must be left
for another day.
The Columbia authors' arguments that pure mortgage modification
would be available to too many mortgages and would ignore the lender's
interest in recovering its investment are simply incorrect. When the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 200933 - the bill passed by
Congress to curb the foreclosure crisis - came to a vote in the Senate,
30 See generally I.RC. S 108 (West 2006).
'3 See Mayer et al., supra note 18, at 426 ("[Pure] mortgage modification is far more aggressive than
the strategies now being developed by lenders. Some strategies, such as forbearance, do not involve principal
write-downs at all.... [Others] provide[ I for reductions in interest rates and forbearance on principal
payments.").
32 See Guy Loranger, North Carolina's Bankruptcy Bar Is Cramming for die Cramdows, N.C. LAW.
WKLY., Mar. 16, 2009, available at httpV/www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-
legislative/12234860-1.html ("The proposed legislation would particularly help homeowners who are
'underwater,' meaning they owe more on their mortgages than their property's fair market value. The
Washington Post reported March 4 that more than 83 million homeowners across the country were in that
situation.").
3 See generally Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of2009, S. 896, 111th Cong.
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Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin offered a nearly identical version of his original
Cramdown Bill as an amendment, and described in detail the various
limitations on a borrower's right to pure mortgage modification included
in his amendment stating that:
What we offer today is significantly different than what we offered
a year ago. We literally give to the banks control over whether a
family in foreclosure can go into bankruptcy. We say that
anybody facing foreclosure - who is delinquent for at least 60 days
on a home that is valued at no more than $729,000, with a
mortgage that was written no later than 2008 - has to show up at
the bank at least 45 days before they file bankruptcy and present
all the economic information, all the financial documents the
bank would need for a mortgage - proof of income, indication of
net worth. If the bank at that point offers them a renegotiated
mortgage - a mortgage which will basically allow them to stay in
the home, that reduces the borrower's mortgage debt-to-income
ratio to 31 percent, which is the standard the administration is
talking about, or offers hope for home refinancing ... and the
person facing foreclosure does not take that offer, then that same
family in foreclosure cannot use the bankruptcy court to rewrite
the mortgage. So in other words, the banks ultimately have the
key to the courthouse. If they make the offer and it is turned
down, that is the end of the story.34
Under Sen. Durbin's cramdown plan, lenders are more than
adequately protected despite the Columbia authors' assertion that pure
mortgage modification does not serve a lender's best interests. 35  Rather
than restate the various terms of the amendment which limit the class of
homeowners who are eligible for pure mortgage modification, the author
would like to emphasize that if a lender offers a voluntary modification to
the borrower, and it is rejected, cramdown is not available to the
borrower.36  Thereafter, the lender's remedies - foreclosure, offering a
3 155 CONG. REc. S4915, S4917 (daily ed. Apr. 30,2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin). The Durbin
Amendment was eventually defeated by a vote of45-51. Id. at S4938; seegenerally id. at S4915-27. Earlier that
week, the amendment's seemingly imminent defeat prompted Sen. Durbin - speaking to the media about
Congress - to state unequivocally that the banking lobby "frankly own[s] the place." Glenn Greenwald, Top
Senate Democrat: Bankers "Oum" the U.S. Congress, SALON, Apr. 30, 2009, httpV/www.salon.corn/opinion/
greenwald/2009/04/3/ownershiVp.
3 But see Mayer et al., supra note 18, at 426.
36 155 CONG. REC. S4915, S4917 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
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second voluntary modification, or attempting to refinance the home with
an entirely new loan - remain undisturbed. In this form, pure mortgage
modification can hardly be considered harmful to the interests of
mortgage lenders, and may incentivize lenders to engage in voluntary
modifications in the future.
Finally, the entire focus of the Columbia authors' plan is misplaced.
Its insistence on further financial incentives for the holders and servicers
of securitized loans fails to identify the real losers in the foreclosure
crisis - homeowners. Despite their belief in the power of these
economic incentives to encourage modifications by servicers and second-
lien lenders, the Columbia authors undermine their own argument by
admitting that "the government should remove legal constraints that now
inhibit modification and will continue to inhibit it even if servicers and
second-lien lenders are given appropriate economic incentives."39 While
the Columbia authors undoubtedly refer to the third prong of their
proposal - a legislatively-enacted litigation safe harbor for servicers who
modify mortgages based on a good-faith belief they are acting in the best
interest of their investors4 - their reference to the necessity of
government action is a tacit admission that financial incentives alone will
not lead to a reduction in foreclosures.
Ultimately, additional financial incentives and a litigation safe harbor
are merely more carrots for the subprime lending industry. Simply put,
the Columbia authors' proposal asks the government to once again
intervene on the side of the risk-takers, rather than stand up for relatively
powerless homeowners on the brink of losing their most valuable asset -
all because the investors are unwilling to accept ultimate responsibility for
the losses associated with today's toxic real estate market.41 Such an
3 See id. (describing a proposal that limits the remedies of homeowners rather than mortgage
lenders).
38 See Mayer et al., supra note 18, at 417, 420-23 (acknowledging the "2.25 million foreclosures started
last year and 1.7 million foreclosures projected to start in 2009," but proposing a plan focused on adding small
incentives for servicers rather than expanding the rights of homeowners facing foreclosure).
3 Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
4 See id. at 423 ("Our Legislative Proposal (1) clarifies that servicers' primary duty is to act in the
economic interest of investors as a group and (2) provides protection against lawsuits when the servicer can
show that its actions were consistent with this duty.").
4 Once again, in spite of their overall proposal to continue subsidizing and protecting investors, the
Columbia authors make another more explicit admission:
The[ ] barriers [preventing voluntary mortgage modification] could be overcome if investors
agreed to rewrite their PSAs. A rewrite typically requires unanimous investor consent, especially if
it would give servicers fieedom to reduce principal or interest rates. ... The number of investors
is so large - and their interests are so divergent - that consensus is a near impossibility. Put
2010] 265
266 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 18:257
argument cannot plausibly be advanced as a better alternative to pure
mortgage modification.
B. The Liao Two-Step Approach
Another practical alternative to pure mortgage modification, proposed
in 2009, much more closely resembles Sen. Durbin's proposal in his
original Cramdown Bill. In contrast to the Columbia authors' focus on
increasing the incentives for servicers who modify mortgages, this second
proposed solution to the foreclosure crisis, advanced by student author
Nina Liao of University of Minnesota Law School, focuses on
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.42 Liao's proposal contains two
steps: (1) a "temporary relief measure" that would allow bankruptcy
judges to engage in pure mortgage modification for qualifying
homeowners for a period of seven years and (2) a retention of pure
mortgage modification as a discretionary tool for bankruptcy judges, so
long as homeowners satisfy strict eligibility requirements.43 To qualify for
Liao's temporary form of cramdown, a homeowner must pass a test
analogous to the general Chapter 13 means test, and must also hold a
nontraditional loan; that is, a loan "with outlandish terms" or a subprime
loan.44
The Chapter 13 "means test" appears in section 1325(b)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code.4 5 That section sets up a general framework in which a
debtor's disposable income is compared to that of the "median family
income of the applicable State," assuming the debtor is the only person
living in her household.4 6 Generally, "the means test compels debtors
with surpluses of income over living expenses to pay unsecured creditors
differently, mortgage securitization has dramatically increased the number of creditors to whom a
homeowner is indebted.... [T]here is no way (at a reasonable cost) to reach a consensus among
creditors. Homeowners bear the consequences of this standstill.
Id. at 419. It is this kind of investment environment that prompted Rhode Island Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse to
make his emphatic statement on the Senate floor about the government's responsibility for, and obligation to
fix, the foreclosure crisis. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
42 See Liao, supra note 4, at 2242-43 ("This Note advocates that Congress pass a temporary cram-
down relief measure.... Congress should then implement a permanent system that entrusts bankruptcy
judges with discretion to modify loans in a manner consistent with jurisdictional Chapter 13 practices and
needs.").
4 See id. at 2265-72.
4 See id at 2268.
45 11 U.S.C. 5 1325(b)(3) (2006).
4 Id. S 1325(b)(3)(A).
THE CASE FOR "CRAMDOWN"
over the life of the [Chapter 13] plan."4 7 Presumably, Liao's approach will
apply an analogous test to homeowners seeking cramdown; thus, if a
homeowner earns a surplus of income over living expenses, cramdown
would not be an available remedy for the debtor's bankruptcy judge.4 8
According to Liao, this expanded "[use of] the means test to determine
cram-down eligibility will assure that debtors entitled to relief are debtors
who cannot pay" their monthly mortgage payment.49
Liao's temporary-relief measure would expire after seven years.so
After the seven-year temporary cramdown period has elapsed,
homeowners seeking cramdown would be required to negotiate with their
lenders.5 1 Furthermore, to encourage homeowners to bargain with their
lenders during negotiations, bankruptcy judges would be required to
consider several objective, jurisdiction-specific factors before cramming
down a homeowner's mortgage, such as "the success rate of crammed-
down plans, the prevalence of bankruptcy abuses, fluctuations of real
estate values, conditions of the financial markets, and the history of
predatory lending."52  While this approach is well-intentioned, its
requirements are ultimately too deferential to the giants of the mortgage-
lending industry. It does not go so far as to explicitly provide another
"carrot" to mortgage-lenders, but instead of handing homeowners a
sturdy and reliable "stick," it gives bankruptcy judges a twig.
Liao's primary objection to pure mortgage modification is that
allowing cramdown for all undersecured mortgages, prime or subprime,
traditional or nontraditional, is "too risky."5 4  The Mortgage Bankers
Association predicts that rising interest rates and higher credit costs are the
inevitable results of unchecked pure mortgage modification, which Liao
contends would undermine the established federal policy of encouraging
lower interest rates and a low cost of credit as the means of promoting
homeownership.55  However, "[t]he empirical evidence indicates that
47 Liao, supra note 4, at 2267.
4 See id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 2269.
s' Id. at 2270-71.
s2 Id. at 2271-73.
53 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
5 Liao, supra note 4, at 2261.
ss Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, MBA's Kittle Challenges Bankruptcy Myths at Hearing
(Jan. 29, 2008), http;//www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/59656.htm [hereinafter MBA
Press Release]; Liao, supra note 4, at 2260-61 (listing "higher interest rates and more expensive credit" as
potential inhibitors to the federal policy of providing affordable housing); see also Coyle, supra note 1, at 5
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there is unlikely to be anything more than a de minimis effect on interest
rates as a result of permitting bankruptcy modification. While Liao
acknowledges the existence of this evidence, she maintains that pure
mortgage modification is unacceptably risky "because it remains uncertain
whether interest rates will rise."57  However, Liao forgets that under
current law, essentially every allowed secured claim, except mortgages on
the debtor's principal residence, is subject to cramdown.58  This includes
vacation homes, second homes, investment properties, and car loans;
items of property for which, Liao admits, consumers have not seen a
decrease in the availability of credit or an increase in interest rates.5 9 Liao
also mentions that antideficiency laws6 - state statutes that prevent
lenders from recovering the difference between the total amount of debt
owed on a mortgage loan and the amount the lender receives in a
foreclosure sale - are similar in their effect to cramdown, and that credit
remains freely available in states where such laws are in effect.6t All things
considered, the provisions of Liao's theory that are meant to contain rising
interest rates and create a "sustainable bankruptcy system" are merely
speculative in nature, and play directly into the hands of the lending
industry, which does not hesitate to capitalize on the fear that the cost of
credit will become prohibitive. 62
(describing the objections to cramdown advanced by the mortgage-lending industry).
56 Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foredosnre Criis: Modfitcation ofMortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wisc. L.
REV. 565, 655. Interestingly, the Columbia authors cite another of Professor Levitin's works for the
proposition that "the cost of future credit could rise significantly, especially for individuals with imperfect
credit records. Empirical evidence suggests that borrowing costs are higher and mortgage amounts are smaller
when mortgages are subject to cramdown." Mayer et al., supra note 18, at 427. For portions of Professor
Levitin's rebuttal, see infra Part III.
5 Liao, supra note 4, at 2261.
58 See Loranger, supra note 32 ("Under present law, a Chapter 13 plan allows judges to adjust the
rights of secured creditors in virtually every type of loan arrangement except for those secured by a mortgage
on the debtor's principal residence.").
5 Liao, supra note 4, at 2255.
6 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. 5 580b (West 2010) (forbidding the entry of a deficiency judgment in
favor of a purchase-money mortgage lender); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 702.06 (West 2010) (prohibiting the entry of
deficiencyjudgments in favor of purchase-money mortgage lenders who emerge from the foreclose sale with
possession of the debtor's home); TIx PROP. CODE ANN. 5 51.004 (Vernon 2007) (allowing any person
obligated to pay a deflciencyjudgment to file an action in Texas courts within 90 days of the foreclosure sale to
establish the fair market value of the foreclosed property and permitting the obligor to apply the difference
between the fair market value of the foreclosed property and the foreclosure sale price as a credit against his
liability for the unpaid portion of the mortgage loan).
61 Liao, supra note 4, at 2255.
62 See supra note 7 (noting that an increase in interest rates for borrowers is one of the many
purported drawbacks to pure mortgage modification).
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Liao is also generally opposed to pure mortgage modification because
of the alleged "moral hazard" that it may create; that is, it will encourage
more homeowners to file for bankruptcy.6 While this argument will be
discussed in more detail in Part III.B of this paper, it is worth noting that
Liao recognizes "the debtors who file for bankruptcy today are more likely
to be honest homeowners rather than opportunistic planners."64 In fact,
empirical evidence indicates that since the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code introduced the means test, which was designed to force
borrowers capable of paying their debts into Chapter 13, the median
income of borrowers in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceedings has remained nearly identical.s
Finally, Liao takes issue with the current bills' lack of a sunset
provision. 6 6 According to Liao, bills " [w]ithout sunset provisions ... fail
to account for long-term, unforeseeable consequences of cram-down,
which may include negative effects on interest rates, homeownership, and
other types of consumer credit." 67  While this may simply be another
6 Liao, supra note 4, at 2258-59.
6 Id. at 2259.
65 Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Refonn Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82
AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 361-62 (2008). According to Lawless and his co-authors, who together participated in a
Harvard University study entitled The Consumer Bankruptcy Project:
The Consumer Bankruptcy Project data permit us to explore whether the income screen mn
the means test pushed those high-income debtors who were more able to pay over to Chapter 13..
. . Median income among Chapter 7 filers in 2001 was $23,761, while median income among
Chapter 7 filers in 2007 was a virtually identical $23,136. Similarly, there is no statistically
significant difference between the median incomes of Chapter 13 filers from 2001 and those from
2007, which were $33,742 and $35,688 respectively.
These data indicate that by yet another measure, BAPCPA seems to have failed its
announced mission. The means test has pushed a higher proportion of bankruptcy debtors into
Chapter 13, but it has not pushed a targeted group of presumptively abusive high-income earners.
The large sorting effects based on income that the means test was supposed to produce simply did
not occur. Instead, the principal effect of the new law was apparently random and arbitrary - the
antithesis ofwhat the supporters ofthe amendments promised.
Id. (citations omitted).
6 Liao, supra note 4, at 2263. See generally Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, S. 896,
111th Cong.; Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, H.R 200, 111th Cong.
(referred to H. Comm. on the Judiciary on Feb. 24, 2009); Helping Families Save Their Homes in
Bankruptcy Act of2009, S. 61, 111th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Jan. 6,2009). None of the bills contains
a sunset provision comparable to the one advocated by Liao. However, the amendment to S. 896 offered by
Sen. Durbin applied retroactively from January 1, 2009 - not prospectively. See 155 CONG. REC. S4915,
S4917 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("[Fluture borrowers aren't even eligible for this
bankruptcy assistance. It ends as ofJanuary 1, 2009. Future mortgages, future foreclosures aren't even affected
by it It has an ending date.").
67 Liao, supra note 4, at 2263.
270 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:257
manifestation of the general fear that the cost of credit will increase if pure
mortgage modification is allowed, Liao acknowledges that part of her
rationale for including a sunset provision is to "provide creditors with an
additional layer of protection."68 Because of the lack of a sunset provision,
Liao declares the bills considered by Congress too stringent at the outset,
and too reckless over time.69
This same criticism can, unfortunately, be leveled at Liao's own
proposal. By conditioning her temporary cramdown provision's
availability on the debtor's qualification under the means test, Liao
essentially guarantees that a substantial number of bankruptcy filers will
not have access to the benefit of cramdown because those debtors who
pass the means test will remain in Chapter 7, where any sensible case
trustee would quickly abandon any interest of the estate in a home
encumbered by an underwater mortgage.70 This restriction is arguably
more detrimental than Sen. Durbin's requirement that a Chapter 13
debtor present a notice of foreclosure to the bankruptcy court before
being eligible for cramdown.7 1 In addition, Liao's proposal fails to provide
for the future as well because it places a higher value on preventing a
foreclosure today than ten years from today. Her seven-year sunset
provision is meant to eliminate the availability of the first step in her plan,
the means test cramdown, once the housing market has recovered.72
'While it is true that the economic needs of the country will be vastly
6 Id.
69 See id. at 2263-64 ("In sum, the pending bills are insufficient because they set up a barrier to
immediate relief and fail to provide for the long run.").
70 See id. at 2267 (advocating use of the means test to determine temporary eligibility for mortgage
modification in Chapter 13); see also STEPHEN L SEPINUCK & LINDAJ. RuSCH, BANKRUPTCY IAW AND
PRACTICE 285 (2007) (suggesting that if a debtor has no equity in his property, the asset is worthless to the
bankruptcy estate and will be abandoned by the case trustee); Sara Murray & Connor Dougherty, Personal
Bankruptcy Filings Rising Fast, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2010, available at httpV/online.wsj.coni/
article/SB126263231055415303.html (noting that as of November 2009, Chapter 7 filings increased by 42%,
while Chapter 13 filings increased a mere 12%). When the vast majority of bankruptcy filers can be
characterized as members of the "middle class," conditioning their eligibility for mortgage modification on
their means test result risks eliminating the availability of the remedy altogether. See Elizabeth Warren,
Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OsGOODE HALL LJ. 115,145-46 (2003) (concluding
that, based on educational, occupational, and home ownership data, 91.8% of bankruptcy filers were members
of the middle class).
71 See Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, S. 61, 111th Cong., S 2 (as
introduced in the SenateJan. 6,2009).
7 See Liao, supra note 4, at 2269 ("The needs of the economy seven years from now will differ from
those today, and a relief measure enacted to address particular problems of a particular recession is unsuitable
for the market once it recovers.").
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different in seven years, the challenges faced by families on the brink of
foreclosure will not. Even if the rising tide of foreclosures eventually
normalizes, it is vital that consumers have a guaranteed, powerful remedy
on their side if they fall on hard times and choose to file for bankruptcy, as
opposed to the mere possibility of receiving the remedy they so
desperately need.
Ultimately, Liao concludes that her proposal is robust enough to stem
the tide of foreclosures, and yet limited enough that it mitigates the risk of
detrimental, unintended consequences from polluting the nation's system
of bankruptcy.74  Despite the admirable attempt to strike a balance
between the proponents and opponents of pure mortgage modification,
Liao's suggested amendment to the text of section 1322(b) fails to
accomplish even this moderate goal. Under present law, section
1322(b)(2) reads, in pertinent part:
the [Chapter 13 repayment] plan shall .. . (2) modify the rights of
holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected
the rights of holders of any class of claims[.]"
As written, this statute is interpreted to preclude modification of a
secured claim on a homeowner's principal residence, but to allow
modification of secured claims on essentially all other types of property.76
Liao proposes that section 1322(b)(2) should be permanently amended to
read as follows:
[T]he plan may modify the rights of holders of secured claims,
including a claim secured only by a security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence, in a manner consistent with
jurisdictional Chapter 13 practices and not inconsistent with this title, or of
7 See id at 2272-73 (describing the multifactor test for bankruptcy judges to apply in future
cramdown cases).
7 See id. at 2273 (concluding that the proposal "should provide relief quickly to distressed Chapter 13
homeowners" but "should sunset ... to account for unforeseeable consequences of cram-down").
7 11 U.S.C. S 1322(b)(2) (2006).
76 Liao, supra note 4, at 2242; see also, e.g., In re Reinhardt, 563 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that,
under the Ohio definition of real property, section 1322(b)(2) did not bar a bankruptcy judge from modifying
a secured creditor's hen on an unattached mobile home when the same creditor also held a security interest in
the real property on which the mobile home was located).
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holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders of any class of claims.7 7
According to Liao, "[t]his altered language will preserve cram-down
and give judges leeway to modify mortgages."78  While both of those
propositions may be true in theory, Liao's proposed amendment to
section 1322(b)(2) gives rise to a glaring unintended consequence - a
result her theory as a whole seeks to avoid.79 By changing the words
"other than" from the original section 1322(b)(2) to read "including," Liao
abrogates the distinction between home mortgage liens and other liens
held by secured creditors.80 Proponents of pure mortgage modification
could hardly argue with this change. However, when Liao's second
proposed amendment to the statute, the addition of "in a manner
consistent with jurisdictional Chapter 13 practices and not inconsistent
with this title[,]" 81 is paired with the first, the new section 1322(b)(2)
could be construed to apply the jurisdictional and discretionary language
of Liao's second proposed amendment to all secured claims in bankruptcy.
Indeed, creditors would likely object to every petition by a debtor for
cramdown on any secured claim, arguing that the new language of the
statute required the bankruptcy judge to engage in the aforementioned
multifactor, jurisdiction-specific test, and to allow cramdown on car, boat,
or vacation home liens only after mandatory negotiations with the
creditor.82
This is certainly not the result Liao's theory intends. Nevertheless,
Liao's proposed language remains instructive of the point that, without
careful drafting, a well-intentioned amendment to the Bankruptcy Code
meant to provide aid to distressed homeowners could in fact lead to a
drastic expansion of creditors' rights. Without undergoing a statutory
face-lift, Liao's proposed amendment fails to implement her wholly
pragmatic, well-designed proposal and, like the Columbia authors'
proposal, creates another substantial "carrot" for the mortgage-lending
industry. Ultimately, the proposal for which Liao advocates is based on a
general fear that lenders will change their lending practices if pure
7 Liao, supra note 4, at 2270 (emphasis added).
78 Id
7 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing other items subject to cramdown, including
vacation homes, second homes, and investment properties).
8 See Liao, supra note 4, at 2270.
s2 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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mortgage modification is allowed. It is to the roots of this fear that this
paper now turns.
III. IDEOLOGICAL OPPOSITION TO PURE MORTGAGE
MODIFICATION
While this paper explores only two practical alternatives to pure
mortgage modification, there are several other paths the government has
taken in an effort to stop the rise in home foreclosures.83  While the
government has considered adding home mortgage cramdown to the
bankruptcy courts' box of tools, it has yet to enact the proposal despite
repeated calls for a change to section 1322(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.8
These efforts have not failed because of their impracticality, but because
of pervasive ideological opposition to the modification of mortgage debt.
For purposes of analysis, I have grouped the ideological arguments against
pure mortgage modification into three categories: (1) arguments based on
the contract rights of lenders; (2) arguments that cramdown creates a
moral hazard that will lead to a flood of bankruptcy filings; and (3) the
injection of fault into the bankruptcy system as a whole. While these
three categories of arguments are certainly not frivolous, they are based on
principles that are either outdated or merely speculative, and serve only to
bolster the false argument that lenders will somehow be treated unfairly
by pure mortgage modification.8 5  The remainder of this paper will
address these arguments.
A. Lenders' Contract Rights
Mortgage lenders argue that pure mortgage modification would
violate their contract rights; specifically, the term the industry uses is
8 See, e.g., ABI, supra note 7, at 95 (identifying alternative proposals such as "federal funds for cities
that implement mandatory mediation proceedings for foreclosures" and "an Obama administration goal to
have started 500,000 [voluntary] loan modifications" by November 1, 2009).
8 See CRS Report Analyzes Four Bills to Modiyj Primary Residence Ereption ofSeaion 1322, BANKR. LAW
DAILY, May 29,2009 (identifying S. 61, H.R 200, H.R. 1106, and H.R. 225, and S. Amdt. 1014 to S. 896 as
bills to modify section 1322).
85 See Worsening Foraiosure Hearings, supra note 13, at 9 (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of law, Georgetown University Law Center) ("The banking industry has not presented a
scintilla of evidence that permitting cramdown would affect credit prices. Instead, they have made declarations
based on a simplistic economic view that greater access to bankruptcy necessarily results in higher costs of
credit and lower credit availability.").
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"sanctity of contract."86 This Lochner-esque argument raises from the dead
the "question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail, - the power
of the state to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person
and freedom of contract."87 Not only has the Supreme Court repudiated
the theory of economic due process and the sanctity of contract in
subsequent decisions," but today's observers realize that a lender arguing
the sanctity of its contract rights puts itself in a precariously hypocritical
position. First of all, the so-called sanctity of the vast majority of home
loans currently in foreclosure is open to debate.89 Sen. Durbin frames his
skepticism of the sanctity of subprime mortgages as follows:
Legitimate mortgage contracts? What is so legitimate about no-
doc, interest only, negative amortizing loans that had almost no
chance to succeed from the day they are underwritten?
The concept of bankruptcy is enshrined in the Constitution, and
bankruptcy has always been a venue in which contracts are
restructured.
The Chamber [of Commerce] and the banking industry had no
problem with applying the sweeping 2005 bankruptcy code
changes to all contracts past, present, and future when those
changes benefitted businesses. They have no standing to now argue
that because of the sanctity of the contract the bankruptcy laws should not be
changed.90
8 See 155 CONG. REc. S4915, S4932 (daily ed. Apr. 30,2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("If you
ask [the mortgage companies] why they are opposing this effort to try to renegotiate a mortgage to keep a
family in their home to avoid this mess, they say. Senator, you don't understand. It is about the sanctity of the
mortgage contract."); see also Rich Leonard, Op-Ed, A Win-Win Bankruptcy Reform, WASH. POsT, Nov. 28,
2008, available at httpV/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyncontent/article/2008/11/27/AR2008112702051.html
("I have twice participated in briefing sessions organized by the House Judiciary Committee, where I was
lectured by lobbyists for the mortgage industry about the sanctity of contracts.").
7 Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45,57 (1905).
8 Cf West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) ("Liberty implies the absence of
arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the
community.").
8 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining that more than one-half of foreclosures in
2008 were subprime, alt-A, and prime/Jumbo loans).
9 155 CONG. REc. S4915, S4934 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (emphasis
added); see also i. at S4920 (statement of Sen. Schumer). Speaking on the broader concept of roadblocks to
modification caused by pooling and servicing agreements, Sen. Schumer also noted the bankruptcy courts'
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Furthermore, Judge Leonard points to the inherent hypocrisy in the
lenders' opposition to using cramdown on a debtor's home mortgage.9 1
Homeowners are the only ones who cannot modify the terms of
their secured debts in bankruptcy. Corporate America flocks to
bankruptcy courts to do precisely this - to restructure and
reamortize loans whose conditions they find onerous or can no
longer meet. Airlines are still flying and auto parts makers still
operating because they have used this powerful tool of the
bankruptcy process. . . . But when the bankruptcy code was
adopted in 1979, the mortgage industry persuaded Congress that
its market was so tightly regulated and conservatively run that it
should be exempted from the general bankruptcy rules permitting
modification.
Thus, the sanctity-of-contract argument essentially puts lenders in a
position to argue that individual debtors who are about to lose their most
valuable asset are also not worthy of the same protections from creditors
as the institutions who do business in the subprime mortgage market and,
ultimately, end up taking the debtors' homes.
Even if one believes in the legitimacy of subprime and nontraditional
mortgages, there is another point that mortgage lenders overlook when
they stress the sanctity of mortgage contracts. As previously mentioned,
under current law, Chapter 13 bankruptcy courts are permitted to modify
any allowed secured claim, except for mortgages on a debtor's primary
residence.' Professor Levitin summarizes the current law best:
A consumer debtor can modify car loans, credit card debt, student
loans, yacht loans, jet-ski loans, snowmobile loans, airplane loans,
computer loans, jewelry loans, and appliance loans, as well as
investment property mortgages and vacation home mortgages. A
consumer debtor can also modify a principal residence mortgage if
it is a multifamily property. This means that a consumer who
unique power under federal law to modify contracts: "We cannot break a contract by law. But the one place in
the U.S. Constitution where a contract can be modified is bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy courts are the only
constitutional way to overcome the securitization contracts and restore some power to the homeowner
himself or herself" Id
91 See Leonard, supra note 86 (writing from his experiences as a Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern
District of North Carolina).
9 Id. (emphasis added).
9 See 11 U.S.C. S 1322(b)(2) (2006).
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rents out the basement or the attic can modify the mortgage on
her house in bankruptcy. The only type of debt that a consumer
cannot modify in bankruptcy is debt on a single-family principal
residence."
Given the nearly unlimited number of liens that are subject to
cramdown, it seems to follow that, in the eyes of the lending industry,
loans on second homes, cars, vacation homes, and airplanes are somehow
less sacred than their interest in a consumer's primary residence.
All things considered, the sanctity-of-contract argument is hardly a
legitimate justification for the mortgage industry's opposition to
cramdown. Lenders only emphasize the sanctity of contract with respect
to mortgages on primary residences, and have not raised a similar
argument with respect to modification of any other secured liens.
Furthermore, in the event that a lending institution were to file for
bankruptcy, it would be eligible to have the principal balance of its debts
modified by the bankruptcy court, without being subject to any
exceptions based on the sanctity of its obligations to its own creditors.
Accordingly, sanctity of contract appears to be mere code language for the
lending industry's double standard with respect to which debtors deserve
modification of secured debts - one of the most powerful protections that
is available to debtors in bankruptcy.
B. The Moral Hazard of Bankruptcy
Both the Columbia authors and Liao identify the possibility that
eliminating the primary residence exception in section 1322(b) will create
a moral hazard for borrowers, and thus encourage homeowners who
would not ordinarily do so to declare bankruptcy as a way of getting out
from under a bad mortgage. 95 The lenders' fear is that a borrower will
rush into bankruptcy during bad times, have the loan on his primary
residence reduced to its current market value, and then reap the rewards
of the eventual, and inevitable, appreciation in value once the market
recovers.9 6  In addition, the moral-hazard argument contemplates
9 Worsening Forelosre Hearings, supra note 13, at 9 (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
9 See Liao, supra note 4, at 2258 ("The moral hazard . .. that creditors fear [is] perhaps less ominous
in an economic downturn."); Mayer et al., supra note 18, at 426 ("[Clramdown legislation could .. .generate a
massive number ofbankruptcy filing.").
% Mayer et al, supra note 18, at 426 ("When house prices rise again, as they eventually will, the
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homeowners using the Bankruptcy Code to eliminate any losses suffered
due to real-estate speculation.97 The underlying assumption of the moral-
hazard-for-borrowers argument is a simple one - too strong a consumer
protection will necessarily lead to untenable abuse of bankruptcy courts.
However, the moral-hazard-for-borrowers argument falls flat on its
face when one simply considers that bankruptcy is almost always a last
resort for debtors. "Chapter 13 is no walk in the park. It requires public
disclosure of every aspect of your life, examinations under oath by a
trustee and creditors, allowing creditors to haul you into court on any
objection, and relinquishment of control of your financial life for up to
five years."98 Even representatives of the mortgage-lending industry admit
that bankruptcy is not where a debtor wants to be. In addition, the
borrowers who do file for bankruptcy protection are far more likely to do
so based on an increasing reliance on debt to make ends meet, as opposed
to frivolous use of credit products.'00
It is also worth noting that there is not only a potential moral hazard
for borrowers, but for lenders as well:
Lenders will lose loan value. While they will generally do better
than in foreclosure, and the loss is not because of bankruptcy per
se, there is still a high price for lenders that will discourage
reckless lending. As for homeowners, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is
not a "drive-by" process. In order to receive a discharge in
borrower will enjoy all of this appreciation.").
9 See Worsening Foreclosure Hearings, supra note 13, at 10 (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (identifying speculators as individuals who
the industry fears would, but in fact would not, benefit from a Cramdown Bill).
98 Leonard, supra note 86.
9 See Coyle, supra note 1 (quoting David Kittle, the Chairman of the Board of the Mortgage Bankers
Association, arguing that "there is nothing good about filing for bankruptcy. Our Congress should not be in
the business of encouraging people to go into bankruptcy."); MBA Press Release, supra note 55 ("There are
very real and severe consequences for consumers who declare bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is a long, arduous,
very public and expensive process, costing thousands of dollars in legal costs. Even when people file for
bankruptcy, almost two thirds of them are unable to fulfill the terms of their repayment plans. Filing
bankruptcy will allow a federally appointed trustee to scrutinize the consumer's every expenditure.
Additionally, bankruptcy stays on a consumers' [sic] credit report for 10 years, making it difficult to acquire
future credit, buy a home, car or insurance and in some cases, even obtain employment.").
'0 See Lawless et al., supra note 65, at 368-69 ("The cumulative effects of the growth in [consumer]
debt have been staggering. In the six years from 2001 to 2007, families that filed for bankruptcy were
collectively carrying 20.8% more secured debt and 43.6% more unsecured debt- all on incomes that remained
static. Additionally, this deterioration in family circumstances appears to have been accelerating.") (citations
omitted).
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Chapter 13, a debtor must live on a court-supervised, meanstested
[sic] budget for 3 or 5 years, and fully repay certain debts,
including allowed secured claims, domestic support obligations,
and tax liabilities. There are also limitations on how often a
debtor may receive a bankruptcy discharge. Nor would
bankruptcy modification give homeowners a windfall. At best, a
homeowner with negative equity would end up with zero equity,
not positive equity. Given the large transaction costs to a sale,
debtors are unlikely to sell their properties for anything beyond a
de minimis profit over the next few years.' 0
Based on this assessment of the miniscule benefits to borrowers, if any, of
entering bankruptcy, the existence of a moral hazard that encourages
borrowers to file for bankruptcy is, at best, questionable.
In addition, lenders' argument that a moral hazard should prevent the
enactment of pure mortgage modification is another hypocritical position.
In fact, Sen. Durbin articulated as much in a speech on the Senate floor
last year:
Why is it in this country, in America, that we can find hundreds of
billions of taxpayers' dollars from hard-working people all over
the United States to come to the rescue of bad banking decisions,
rotten investments, mortgages that were fraudulent on their face,
but can't summon the political will to do something about 8
million families in America who are going to face foreclosure?102
Sen. Durbin's statement demonstrates that a similar and more
daunting moral hazard exists for lenders - if the lenders make the loans,
and the loans turn out to be bad business decisions, the taxpayers will
provide lenders with a clean slate. Continued use of taxpayer money as
insurance for lenders who made poor business decisions is not a
sustainable solution to the foreclosure crisis. However, even if one agrees
that amending the Bankruptcy Code will encourage more filings, one
need only remember that compared to the moral hazard facing the
101 Worsening Foredosure Hearings, supra note 13, at 11 (written testimony ofAdam J. Levitin, Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
102 See 155 CONG. REC. S4915, S4916 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (Sen.
Durbin further stated, "How many of these bankers paid for their bad business judgment, with their
multimillion dollar bonuses, with the rescues we have provided from American taxpayers - hard-earned tax
dollars sent their way? The fact is we have been kind to these bankers who have brought us into this crisis.").
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lending industry, the moral hazard facing borrowers who are considering
bankruptcy in order to take advantage of cramdown is a far less expensive
moral hazard to tolerate. 0 3
C. Injection ofFault into the Bankruptcy Code
Finally, a less explicit, yet equally stubborn, ideology that inhibits the
passage of some version of the Cramdown Bill is the unspoken belief that
a debtor's bankruptcy is somehow his or her own fault. While closely
related to the previous section on the moral hazards of bankruptcy, fault
finds its way into the picture through the legislative intent of the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.104  For example, Liao points out
that the purpose of these amendments were to prevent bankruptcy abuses
and "to create roadblocks in the Code to prevent reckless spenders from
obtaining bankruptcy protection."tos The aforementioned means test
enforces these goals by sending debtors with too much money out of
Chapter 7 and into Chapter 13 (or possibly to a dismissal of their
bankruptcy petitions), and assures that debtors who voluntarily file under
Chapter 13 apply their surplus income to the repayment of creditors.'0 6
While this may seem like a harmless procedural mechanism, the plain
language of the Code sets up a scheme that "presume[s] abuse" of the
Bankruptcy Code unless the debtor meets specific income
requirements. 0 7  Given the previously discussed undesirability of filing
for bankruptcy, requiring courts to presume abuse if the debtor meets a
certain asset threshold displays intent to punish "reckless spenders," rather
than provide the "fresh start" that is the ultimate policy goal of the
103 See Worsening Foreclosure Hearings, supra note 13, at 11 (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) ("[O]ne of the greatest advantages of
bankruptcy modification is that it has no cost for taxpayers. In an age of a trillion dollars in government
bailouts, bankruptcy modification is a rare bargain").
10 See SEPINUCK & RUSCH, supra note 70, at 396 ("Despite [the pre-2005 judicial definition of
substantial abuse under section 707], Congress believed that debtors were still abusing the bankruptcy process
and in 2005 it significantly altered [section] 707(b)."). Sepinuck and Rusch note that the 2005 changes to
section 707(b) eliminated the requirement of "substantial abuse" before dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition in
favor of mere "abuse," eliminated the judicial presumption in favor of granting the debtor's requested relief
and removed limitations on who had standing to accuse the debtor of abusing the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at
397. Accordingly, I characterize these reforms as injecting the concept of fault into the Bankruptcy Code
because, their purported anti-abuse purpose implies that debtors are not filing because of hardship, but
because they wish to avoid responsibility for payment of their debts.
105 Liao, supra note 4, at 2246.
106 See id. at 2246-47.
107 See 11 U.S.C. S 707(b)(2) (2006).
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Bankruptcy Code. 0 8  So long as the means test remains in place and
forces debtors out of Chapter 7 and into either Chapter 13 or a dismissal,
the current law will be far too focused on preventing abuse instead of
helping debtors who are on the brink of losing their homes. Prevention
of abuse is no reason to deny relief to the vast majority of legitimate
bankruptcy debtors.
IV. CONCLUSION
A right to pure mortgage modification in bankruptcy proceedings
should not amount to merely another "carrot" for the mortgage-lending
industry. It also should not be a mere twig given to a bankruptcy judge.
Pure mortgage modification should be an aggressive, powerful remedy
given to homeowners for use as a tool to bring lenders to the negotiating
table and keep them there, or to expedite the time at which the lender
takes the losses it would ordinarily expect to endure in a foreclosure
proceeding.109 According to Professor Levitin,
[t]he foreclosure crisis is not about to stop any time soon.
Judicially-supervised restructuring of mortgages is the only tool
we have left in the box. It's a tool we know can work. It's a tool
that can save hundreds of thousands of families their homes and
help stabilize communities, housing markets, and the economy.
It's time to use it. 110
The practical alternatives discussed in Part II rely too heavily on
incentives for lenders who have already received plenty of help from the
1os See Liao, supra note 4, at 2244-47.
0 See Worsening Forelosure Hearings, supra note 13, at 13 (written testimony of Alys Cohen, National
Consumer Law Center) ("[I] investors are losing mind-boggling[,] large sums of money on foreclosures. The
available data suggests that investors lose ten times more on foreclosures than they do on modifications."); see
also id. at 9 (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center). Professor Levitin describes the allocation of the lender's loss thusly.
The choice a mortgagee faces is not bankruptcy loss versus no loss, but bankruptcy loss versus
foreclosure loss. So long as bankruptcy losses are smaller than foreclosure losses, permitting
bankruptcy modification will not result in higher prices. Thus, it all comes down to the question
of whether lenders lose more in bankruptcy than in foreclosure. The best evidence on the
question says they do not, and this is not surprising, bankruptcy lawguarantees duat lenders will reoer at
least as muds as in afeelosure.
Id. (emphasis added).
no Id. at 11 (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center).
THE CASE FOR "CRAMDOWN"
government, and do not go far enough toward giving homeowners a
powerful judicial remedy that will decrease the number of foreclosure
filings, increase the number of voluntary modifications, and keep
borrowers in their homes.'"
To this end, the government should immediately amend section
1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code to read: "The plan may ... (2) modify
the rights of holders of secured claims, or of holders of unsecured claims, or
leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims." This provision
should go into effect immediately, should not be restricted to particular
types of mortgages or borrowers, and should not be subject to a sunset
provision. Furthermore, states should stem the tide ofjudicial foreclosure
filings by creating a cramdown cause of action that homeowners may raise
as an affirmative defense to a foreclosure action. Mere reduction of
interest rates is not enough; the problem is that too many homeowners
are "underwater."1 2 A formidable judicial remedy like this one will be the
ultimate "stick" for homeowners to use as protection from lenders who
would rather foreclose than agree to modify primary residence mortgage
loans.
"II See supra Part H for discussion of the proposals.
112 See supra note 32 and accompanying text
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